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THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST STANDARD
IN ERISA CASES:
CAN IT BE AVOIDED IN THE
DENIAL OF HIGH DOSE CHEMOTHERAPY
TREATMENT FOR BREAST CANCER?
Judith C. Brostron°
INTRODUCTION
Breast cancer is currently the second leading cause of cancer deaths
among American women.' One out of every eight women in the United
States will develop breast cancer at some time over the course of her
lifetime.2 The overall five-year relative survival for breast cancer is
seventy-five percent.3
While advances in the treatment of breast cancer have been made
over the last twenty years, the long-term prognosis remains dismal for
metastatic cancer4 after treatment with conventional-dose chemotherapy.?
*Member, Lashly & Baer, P.C., St. Louis, MO., J.D., 1985, Chicago-Kent College of La,,
LL.M., St. Louis University School of Law, 1999. This article is dedicated to breast cancer
survivors, Marianne Curran and Diane Kaufman, the author's mother and sister.
'See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSUrANCE: COVERAGE OF ALTOLOGOU
BONE MARRow TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREAST CANCER 3 (1996) [hereinafter GA 0 Rcpart].
2See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, INC., CANCER FACTS & FIGURES S (1997)_
3See Marilyn Dix Smith and William F. McGhan, Financial Facts About Trcatng Breast
Cancer, Bus. & HEALTH, Dec. 1996, at 67. "[T]hree out of four women %, ho are treated for breast
cancer this year will be alive five years from now. More specifically, 93 of 100 women diagnoed
with localized breast cancer will be alive five years hence, as will 71 out of 100 v, ith region2
spreading of the cancer but only 18 out of 100 with distant metastases," See id
4See id.
5See Scott I. Bearman, et al., High-Dose Chemotherapy u:ith Autologous Hcnaopotctle
Progenitor Cell Support for Metastatic and High-Risk Primary Breast Cancer, 23 SEMI \A s I
ONCOLOGY 60, 60 (1996). The median survival rate for patients with metastatic breast cancer is
approximately two years. See id.
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Over the past ten years, high-dose chemotherapy followed by an
autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC-ABMT)6 has been used for the
treatment of metastatic cancer.7 Studies have shown that HDC-ABMT
results in higher rates of complete remission than generally seen in
conventional-dose chemotherapy regimens for patients with metastatic
breast cancer.8 Disease free survival at two to five years is reported in ten
to thirty percent of patients.9 Some reports indicate that autologous bone
marrow transplant (ABMT) extends the life of the women with stage IV
breast cancer for three to five years in fifty percent of the cases studied."t
The purpose of the HDC-ABMT procedure" is to administer higher
6See id. The treatment is also referred to as peripheral stem cell transplant (PSCT),
peripheral blood stem cell transplant (PBSCT), or peripheral stem cell rescue (PSCR), and is used
in the cases interchangeably with HDC-ABMT. The terms are used interchangeably in this paper,
and are meant to refer to a stem cell specimen that is removed from the patient's bone marrow or
blood and saved and subsequently administered to the patient after the high dose chemotherapy.
See id. See also Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, 893 F. Supp. 1559, 1572 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(holding that even though ABMT and PSCR both accomplish the same thing when used with
HDC, since the contract explicitly denied coverage for ABMT for breast cancer because PSCR was
not excluded it was covered).
7 See Bearman, supra note 5, at 60; Pablo J. Cagnoni, et al., Paclitaxel-Containing High-
Dose Chemotherapy: The University of Colorado Experience, 23 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY 43,
43 (1996).
8See Frederick R. Appelbaum, The Use ofBone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Stem Ccll
Transplantation in the Treatment of Cancer, 46 CA 142, 157 (1996); H. Kent Holland, Mininal
Toxicity and Mortality in High-Risk Breast Cancer Patients Receiving High-Dose
Cyclophosphamide, Thiotepa, and Carboplatin Plus Autologous Marrow/Stent-Cell
Transplantation and Comprehensive Supportive Care, 14 J. OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1156, 1156
(1996).
9See Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 157. Several studies have shown that 15-25% of patients
with metastatic disease can be disease free at 3-5 years. See id. Cf Bone Marrow Transplant
Questioned in Breast Therapy, MED. INDus. TODAY, Mar. 27, 1996, at 3 (stating that a study by
the Emergency Care Research Institute found that ABMT may not be as effective as expected in
increasing survival rates for advanced breast cancer patients).
'
0See Bill GuaranteesAccess to Breast Cancer Treatment, Bone Marrow Transplant (visited
July 14, 1997) <http:/wvw.med.stanford.edu/CBHP/Articles/midgen-bill.html>.
"See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 4. The therapy consists of the following:
ABMT is a therapy that allows a patient to receive much higher dosages of
chemotherapy than is ordinarily possible. Because high-dose chemotherapy is
toxic to the bone marrow (which supports the immune system), methods have
been developed for restoring the bone marrow by reinfusing stem cells (the bone
marrow cells that mature into blood cells) taken from the patient before
chemotherapy. Stem cells are removed from the patient's blood or bone marrow,
then concentrated, frozen, and sometimes purged in an attempt to remove any
cancerous cells. The patient then undergoes chemotherapy at dosages two to ten
times the standard dosage. To restore the ability to produce normal blood cells
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than normal doses of chemotherapy in an attempt to kill cancer cells. The
main side effect of the chemotherapy is that in addition to killing cancer
cells, it also destroys the bone marrow which is responsible for making
new cells.1 2 The procedure consists of removing stem cells 3 from the
patient's bone marrow or blood stream and freezing the cells for later
use.14 After the administration of the high-dose chemotherapy the stem
cells are given back to the patient in an effort to "rescue" the bone marrow
and help to produce cells."5 The woman is usually kept in isolation until
her blood tests indicate that she is producing white blood cells to fight
infection. 6
ABMT costs from about $80,000 to over $150,000 compared with
about $15,000 to $40,000 for conventional-dose chemotherapy.17 Several
studies have indicated that conventional-dose chemotherapy is cost
effective."S In an early study, chemotherapy benefitted all women at a cost
of $4,500-$9,000 per quality-adjusted life-year.' 9 One study calculated
the cost-effectiveness ratio of ABMT at $97,000 per quality adjusted life
year which is at least ten times that of standard chemotherapy.")
Some insurance companies deny coverage for HDC-ABMT under
policy exclusions for experimental or investigational treatment.2 1 A study
and fight infections, thepatient's concentrated stem cells are thawed and reinfuzed
after chemotherapy. When the transplant is done from the blood rather than the
bone marrow, the procedure is often referred to as peripheral blood stem cell
transplantation.




"See Melody L. Harness, iWiat is "Experimental" Medical Trcatwnt9 - A Lcgislata.r
Definition isNeeded, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67,72-74 (1996) (discussing off-label drugs; the dru2s
are not Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved in the doses given),
6See Holland, supra note 8, at 1160. In one study involving ABMT and peripheral blood
stem cell rescue (PBSC) the median time to achieve neutraphil recovery v as tv,-elve days for both
the bone marrow recipients and the PBSC recipients. See id




9See Smith, supra note 3, at 67. Conventional chemotherapy is about as cost effective as
treating hypertension. See id.
20See id.
2"See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 5. See also Michael J. Brandi, Tiw Paradox of
Technological Progress in Health Insurance Contracts: "Expcrincntal Trcatment Clause" and
Breast Cancer, 2 CONN. INS. L. J. 243, 247 (1996) (stating that the majority of insurance polictes
contain some form of coverage limitation for treatment not considered "standard" or commonly
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done in 1996 by the General Accounting Office indicates that some
insurers cover HDC-ABMT based on the clinical evidence of
effectiveness, fear of litigation and adverse public relations.22 Many states
require private insurers to cover HDC-ABMT through mandated insurance
benefit laws.23 Some state medicaid programs cover HDC-ABMT.24 The
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program also covers HDC-ABMT
Many lawsuits have been filed by patients who have been denied
HDC-ABMT by their insurance plans.26 Since the majority of employed
individuals obtain their insurance coverage from their employers, most
cases involving the denial of insurance benefits are subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).27
When an insurance company administers an ERISA plan under a
policy it issued, a conflict of interest exists.2" The Circuit Courts have
applied different standards of review in ERISA denial of benefits cases
used by practitioners); Julia Field Costich, Denial of Coverage for "Experimental" Medical
Procedures: The Problem ofDe Novo Review Under ERISA, 79 KY. L. J. 801,807 (1991) (stating
that health insurance policies commonly exclude benefits for medical procedures found to be
"experimental" or "investigational" in nature).
"See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 2. The health insurers interviewed for the G.A.O.
Report were Aetna Health Plans, Anthem Health Plan of Florida, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Oregon, C.N.N. Insurance, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, HealthGuard of Lancaster,
HealthPartners, Kaiser Permanente, Mutual of Omaha, Prudential HealthCare Group, United
HealthCare (formerly Meta Health), and United HealthCare of Ohio. See id. See also Deborah
Shalowitz Cowans, Experimental Treatment Being Covered, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 17,
1996, at 56 (listing several factors as responsible for the increased willingness of health insurers
to pay for experimental treatment including clinical evidence of the treatment's success, fear of
litigation, adverse publicity for denying coverage, and state laws mandating coverage).
'See Provider Contracting & Capitation: State Benefit Mandates Force Contract Change
for Plans, MANAGED CARE WK., Feb. 17, 1997., at 30-31. The article opines that state mandates
drive up health insurance coverage. Blue Cross & Blue Shield reports monthly premiums for
small groups increasing from 5% in Mississippi to 21% in Virginia as a direct result of mandated
benefits in fifteen states. See id.
24See G.A.O. Report, supra note I, at 2.
2'See id.
26See id.
2"See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). Seventy-five percent of employer provided health insurance
plans are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See Barry R. Furrow,
Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419,494
(1997); See also Berkeley Rice, Look Who's on the Malpractice Hot Seat Now; But Don't Think
Doctors Are Off the Hook, MED. EcON., Aug. 12, 1996, at 200 (noting that health insurers
increasingly pay for ABMT because "they're tired of being sued and there's so much public
pressure for this"). Under ERISA suit can be brought for the cost of the benefit denied only. The
plaintiff may not sue to recover lost wages, pain and suffering or physical injury. See id. at 192.
"See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11 th Cir.
1990).
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when there is a conflict of interest. The standards have been
inconsistently applied.2 9 The specific contract language limiting coverage
may not be enforced when there is a conflict of interest.30
This article focuses on the denial of benefits for HDC-ABMT in an
ERISA plan when there is a conflict of interest. The background
information discusses HDC-ABMT as a treatment for breast cancer and
other forms ofcancer. It also explains the background material for ERISA
regarding the denial of benefits when a conflict of interest exists. This
section includes a discussion of the Supreme Court case of Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch and the de novo and arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. The standards ofreview section identifies the criteria
for determining when a conflict of interest exists and analyzes the case
law and the tests utilized by the Circuit Courts for reviewing denial of
ERISA benefits cases where there is a conflict of interest. It also
hypothesizes that a conflict of interest standard provides the reviewing
court with an opportunity to circumvent the coverage specified in the
insurance contract. This occurs despite the amount of deference that
should be accorded to the fiduciary under the "abuse of discretion" or
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. Finally, suggested
recommendations for insurance companies to avoid the conflict of interest
standard, and for limiting coverage for experimental treatment are
discussed.
BACKGROUND
High-Dose Chemotherapy With Autologous Bone
Marrow Transplantation (HDC-ABMT)
Every year hundreds of thousands of women are diagnosed with breast
cancer.31 The treatment for breast cancer depends on the clinical stage of
the cancer when it is diagnosed.-- There are four clinical stages of breast
29See id.
'OSee id.
3'See Smith, supra note 3, at 67. Each year, 182,000 women are diagnoscd with breaz
cancer. See id.
'2See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 4. The treatments for breast cancer are surgery,
chemotherapy, radiation therapy, and hormone therapy. See id
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cancer.33  Women with stage I breast cancer, in which the cancer is
confined to the breast tissue only, have an excellent chance of long term
survival.34 Stage IV breast cancer, in which the cancer has spread or
metastasized from the breast tissue to the skin or other organs, is usually
fatal even with conventional treatment.35
One of the treatments for metastatic breast cancer (stage IV) is HDC-
ABMT.36 HDC-ABMT for the treatment of metastatic breast cancer is
controversial.37 Experts claim that the clinical research has not yet proven
that HDC-ABMT is more effective than conventional-dose
33The four clinical stages of breast cancer, increasing in severity from Stage I to Stage IV
(metastatic) breast cancer are as follows:
Stage I:
(a) A tumor which is two centimeters or less in its greatest dimension;
(b) No involvement of axillary lymph nodes; or
(c) No evidence of distant metastases.
Stage II:
(a) A tumor two centimeters or less in its greatest dimension with positive axillary nodes
and no distant metastases; or
(b) A tumor more than two but less than five centimeters in its greatest dimension with
or without axillary lymph node involvement and no distant metastases.
Stage III:
(a) Tumors between two and five centimeters in their greatest dimension with positive
axillary nodes fixed to one another or to other structures and no distant metastases;
or
(b) Tumors greater than five centimeters in their greatest dimension with or without
axillary lymph node involvement and no distant metastases.
Stage IV:
(a) A tumor of any size with direction extension to chest wall or skin;
(b) Any tumor with involvement ofhomolateral supra-clavicular or infraclavicular lymph
nodes; or
(c) Any tumor with distant metastases including skin involvement beyond the breast area.
HealthCare Am. Plans, Inc., v. Bossemeyer, 953 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 n.2 (D. Kan. 1996),
34See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 4.
3SSee id.36See id.
37See Mark Hagland, Technology and Treatments on Trial, HOSP. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, July 5, 1996, at 40. The Technology Evaluation Center which is cosponsored by
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and Kaiser Permanente has declared that based on
scientific evidence from two recent studies and other research that HDC-ABMT is a viable option
for some women with advanced metastatic breast cancer provided the treatment takes place at an
experienced cancer center. See id.
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chemotherapy. 8 While many phase I and phase II clinical trials 9 have
been performed to assess the efficacy of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer
most experts agree that phase II randomized clinical trials are necessary
to establish that high dose chemotherapy is superior to conventional-dose
chemotherapy.
40
Until now, no large randomized clinical trials in the United States
have been completed.41  Most patients do not want to risk being
randomized to the arm of low-dose or standard-dose chemotherapy. 2
There are two major reasons for this apprehension. First, there is a fift,
percent chance that a patient will not receive the high dose chemotherapy
in a randomized trial.43 Second, few insurance companies cover treatment
in a clinical trial.44
'
8See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 5.
"See Holland, supra note 8, at 1156. Phase I and phase II clinical trials are also being
performed to assess adjuvant therapy for positive axillary node disease. See id
4'See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 4-5. The G.A.O. Report descnbes clintcal trials as
follows:
A clinical trial is a medical experiment in which procedures or drugs are tested on
human subjects to assess their safety or effectiveness. Phase I trials are designed
to determine the dose that can be given with an acceptable level oftoxicity. Phaze
II trials seek to evaluate the response in specific tumor tyes. Phase ll trials seek
to assess a treatment's effectiveness by comparing patients receiving the
experimental treatment with patients receiving conventional treatment. In a
randomized phase III trial, patients are randomly assigned either to a control
group receiving standard treatment or to one or more expcrmental groups
receiving the treatment being tested.
Id. at 5. Phase IV "post marketing" studies are designed to collect additional information
about a treatment. See Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 920 F. Supp 477,452 n 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also J. Gregory Lahr, What is the Method to Thucr "'Madness" '
Experimental Treatment l-rclusions in Health Instrance Policies, 13 J. CO TE'.ip. HL & POL'Y
613,620-23 (1997) (describing clinical trials, and how experimental procedures becomestandard).4
,See Elisabeth de Vries, Breast Cancer Studies in theNetherlands, L.,NCET, Aug 10,1996,
at 407. HDC is so widely available in the U.S. there is difficulty recruiting patients for
randomized clinical trials. Patients do not want to be randomized to the low doze chemotherapy
One of the largest studies is taking place in the Netherlands and will have more than 370 patients
The results will not be available until 2000. See id.
42See Harness, supra note 15, at 71-72 (discussing the obstacles to patient enrollment in
clinical trials).
43See Healthcare Am. Plans, Inc., v. Bossemeyer, 953 F. Supp. 1176, 1 184 (D Nan. 1996).
"SeeLawsuitsPublicity Driving Transplants, HOSP. & HEALTHNETWOKS, June 20,1996,
at 72. There are four randomized trials in progress by the National Cancer Institute INCI) but the
NCI lamented that few insurers pay for treatment in clinical trials. The NIH is also doing clinical
trials and having a difficult time getting patients to participate. Results vill not be a%ailable for
two years. See id.
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Currently, there are four randomized clinical trials being conducted
by the National Cancer Institute to determine whether ABMT is better
than conventional-dose chemotherapy." The trials involve approximately
2,000 women at more than seventy institutions. 6 At least one of these
randomized trials appears to confirm the superiority of high dose
chemotherapy (HDC) over conventional chemotherapy for metastatic
breast cancer.47 A national randomized clinical trial for patients with ten
or more positive axillary lymph nodes is currently ongoing which should
help to clarify the role of HDC in the management of high risk breast
cancer.
49
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
ERISA regulates employee welfare benefit plans.50 An employee welfare
benefit plan is defined in the statute to be a "plan, fund, or program" that
provides pension benefits or non-pension benefits (health benefits) or
both.5 2  Plans providing health benefits are termed "welfare plans" or
"welfare benefit plans."53 ERISA also establishes procedural standards
such as reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibilities, but does not
regulate the substantive content of health insurance coverage provided in
the employee welfare benefit plan.5
4
45See id. But see Cancer Care: NC[IProposes Partnership with HMOs, HEALTH LINE, June
26, 1996, at 21 (discussing plans between the National Cancer Institute, HMOs, and insurers to
form a partnership under which they would agree to cover the medical costs of enrollees who
participate in NCI clinical trials).46See G.A.O. Report, supra note 1, at 4-5.47See Cagnoni, supra note 6, at 43. In the Bezwoda study the median duration for survival
for the high-dose patients was 90 weeks as opposed to 45 weeks for standard-dose chemotherapy.
Many oncologists feel that this result is significant. See id.4SSee id. See also Patrick Beaty MD, Taking Issue with ECRI Findings on HDC/ABMT
Success Rates in Treating Breast Cancer, TRANSPLANT NEWS, May 28, 1996, at 39 (stating that
the results of the ABMT randomized trial showed that the "median duration for survival for the
high-dose patients was 90 weeks, as opposed to 45 weeks for standard dose therapy patients.").49See id.
50See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U'S. 724, 732
(1985). See also Jennifer Hardester, Furtherance of an Equitable, Consistent Structure for
ReviewingExperimental Coverage Decisions: The Lessons ofPitman v. Bhle Cross & Blue Shield
of Oklahoma, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 296-301 (1994) (discussing ERISA),
"'29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
'2See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994).
53Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732.
54See id.(citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114 (1994)).
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The ERISA statute distinguishes between employee welfare benefit
plans that are self-insured and plans that involve the purchase of
insurance. The distinction between insured and uninsured plans for
purposes of state law is that plans that purchase insurance are regulated by
the insurance industry.56  This occurs as a result of ERISA's broad
preemption. 7 The statute provides specifically that it shall "supercede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan."5 Preemption is substantially qualified by the
"insurance savings clause" which provides that nothing in ERISA "shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, bandng, or securities."59 The exception to the
savings clause is called the "deemer clause" which states that no employee
benefit plan "shall be deemed to be an insurance company... . " The
"deemer clause" exempts employee welfare benefit plans from insurance
regulation.6 ' The effect of the statutes is that the only employee welfare
benefit plans that are not subject to state laws are the self-funded plans.
The other difference between self-funded ERISA plans and insured
plans is that the insurer's assets are not included in the ERISA plan or held
in trust.62  Trust law governs the administration of the plan. The
55See 29 U.S.C. §I 103(b)(1) (1994).
56See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 89S F.2d 1556, 1559 (1 th Cir 1990)
(citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins, Co, 471 US. 724, 73S47
(1985)) ("Congress intended a distinction between insured and uninsured plans such that the
former are subject to state regulations, for example, mandated-benefit laws, that have the effect
of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk, that are an integral part of the policy relattonship
between the insurer and the insured, and that are limited to entities within the insurance mdustry ")
S7See 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (1994). See also Wendy K. Mariner, Outcones Asscsswcnt in
Health Care Reform: Promise or Limitations, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 37, 51 (1994)1 discu.sing
ERISA preemption of state laws that mandate coverage for HDC-ABMT and health reform
legislation).
"S29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
"929 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
'029 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(B) (1994).
6 Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561 citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144{b)(2)(B)) (1994).
"Regarding the trust nature of ERISA the Eleventh Circuit stated:
The statute provides, with enumerated exceptions, "all assets of an emplol e
benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees." 29 U S.C. § 1103(a)
(1994). Insurance policy plans fall within the exceptions. The pohcy is an assct
of the plan, but the insurer's assets are not thereby included in the plan. [T]he
insurance policy, is not an asset held in trust for the beneficiaries of the plan
because the trust requirements of section 1103(a) do not apply "to assets of a plan
which consist of insurance contracts of policies issued by an insurance company
1999]
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deferential standard of review was developed because of the trust nature
of ERISA.63 When a conflict of interest exists between the fiduciary role
and the profit-making objective of an insurance company a highly
deferential standard of review may not be appropriate.
64
The ERISA fiduciary is the administrator of the plan who makes
benefit determinations.65 The duties and responsibilities of the fiduciary
are defined by the ERISA statute. 6 The fiduciary must act in the best
interest of the beneficiaries. 7
Pursuant to ERISA, a participant or beneficiary may "bring a civil
action to recover benefits due under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan." 68  Under ERISA, plan beneficiaries
improperly denied benefits can recover the monetary value of the benefit
but cannot sue for lost wages, pain and suffering, or wrongful death.'9
qualified to do business in a State." 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1) (1994).
Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561.63SeeBrown, 898 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Moon v. America Home Assurance Co., 88 F.2d
86, 89 (11 th Cir. 1989)) (stating that since "the basis for the deferential standard of review in the
first place was the trust nature of most ERISA plans," the most important reason for deferential
review is lacking).
'See id. at 1562. "Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its own
assets rather than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its profit-
making role as a business. That is, when an insurance company serves as ERISA fiduciary to a
plan composed solely of a policy or contract issued by that company, it is exercising discretion
over a situation forwhich it incurs 'direct, immediate expense as a result of benefit determinations
favorable to plan [p]articipants." Id. (quoting De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1191 (4th
Cir. 1989)).65See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1) (1994).
66
"The statute provides as follows:
(1)[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(1) providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries; and
(2) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aim;
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).67See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
6829 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
69See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 507-12 (1996).
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There is concurrent jurisdiction 7 in state and federal court but ajury trial
is not available under ERISA.7 ' Remedies under ERISA are equitable in
nature and consist of obtaining the monetary amount of benefits due,
injunction, or declaratory judgment.'
The judicial review of the denial of coverage case under an ERISA
plan has been inconsistent.73 Typically the insurance company denies
coverage because it determines that the HDC-ABMT is "experimental" or
"investigationar' pursuant to the insurance contract.74 Depending upon
whether the term "experimental" is defined or not, the courts have found
that the definition or lack of definition is either ambiguous and construe
the ambiguity against the insurer or not ambiguous and uphold the
contract interpretation. 7' Earlier cases were ambiguous because
experimental was not defined.76 As a result of decisions against insurers
on the basis of ambiguity, contracts have been changed7 and many now
explicitly deny coverage for HDC-ABMT.7"
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. r. Brucch
The Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch established
de novo judicial review for cases involving denial of ERISA benefits
7OSee 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1994) (stating that "state courts of compctentjurizdilcton and
district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under pa-agraph
(1)(B) and (7) of subsection (a) of this section.")
71See Turner v. Fallon Com. Health Plan, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419,421-23 (D. Maz, 1997),
'7See29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
73See Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing New Technologies' i,7hy are the Courts Jtdging
Experinental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1095,1098-1 104(1992); Denise S, Wolf, WlzoStwd
Pay For "Experimental" Treatments? Breast Cancer Patients v. Thetr Insurers, 44 AM. U, L
REv. 2029, 2063-93 (1995); Mark A. Hall, et al., Mechanisms of Consumer Proicctan - 71
Marketplace and Regulation: Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumcrs An Empirical
Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1055, 1055 (1996).
74Wilson v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv. Inc., 791 F. Supp. 309,311 (D.C. 1992),
7 See Wolf, supra note 73, at 2063-72 (discussing the exclusions for experimental medical
treatment and whether the experimental exclusions are defined); Hamess, supra note 15, at 79-90;
Brandi, supra note 21, at 72-74.7 6See Saver, supra note 73, at 1098-1104.
'See Wilson, 791 F. Supp. at 311 (noting that Blue Cross conceded that it acted out ofself-
interest in changing the policy and excluding coverage).
7 See Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting
that even though the contract explicitly excluded coverage for ABMT or SCR with HDC the court
held that since chemotherapy was covered elsewhere the contract was ambiguous). Se also
Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, S93 F. Supp. 1559, 1572 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (noting that even
though ABMT and PSCR accomplish the same thing since the contract explicitly denied coverage
for ABMT the court held that PSCR was covered).
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unless "the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of
the plan., 79 De novo review is appropriate whether the plan is funded or
unfunded and whether or not the administrator or fiduciary is operating
under a possible or actual conflict of interest.80 However, the Firestone
Court held that when the administrator has discretionary authority, the
applicable standard of review is the arbitrary and capricious standard.8'
In reaching this holding, the Court looked to the principles of trust law.82
Trust law makes a deferential standard of review appropriate when a
trustee exercises discretionary powers.8 3
When a conflict of interest exists because the insurer is also the plan
administrator, the claim must be reviewed with a reduced level of
deference.84 The "conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion"' in the denial of benefits." This
standard was also derived from trust law. Firestone also specifically
states however that if no discretion is reserved to the administrator then
the de novo standard is applied even if a conflict of interest exists.86
De Novo vs Arbitrary and Capricious
Standard of Judicial Review:
The Grant of Discretionary Authority
The Court in Firestone established that, in cases where the plan
specifically grants discretion to the fiduciary to construe the terms of the
plan and to determine eligibility for benefits, the standard of review is
abuse of discretion. 7 Under the abuse of discretion or arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, the court should defer to the fiduciary's
decision and the denial of coverage should only be overturned if the court
determines that the fiduciary abused his or her discretion or that the denial
9Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
"
0See id.
"See id. at 113.
"See id. at 112-13.
"See id. at 111.
4See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (holding that the de novo standard applies).
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of coverage was arbitrary and capricious.83 The administrator's decision
should not be disturbed if reasonable.89
When determining the standard of review, the court initially must
review the contract to determine whether discretion is granted to the
fiduciary of the plan.90 The Firestone Court did not specify the language
that must be contained in the plan in order to grant discretion to the
fiduciary. Instead, the Court in Firestone only advised that the vritten
instruments should be reviewed as "determined by the provisions of the
[plan] as interpreted in light of all the circumstances and such other
evidence of the intention of the [plan's creator] with respect to the [plan]
as is not inadmissible."91
Courts have upheld the grant of discretionary authority where the
plan is clear and unequivocal.92 To determine this, the court looks to the
intent of the drafter of the plan.93 In Brown v. Bhe Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama, the contract language provided that "[a]s a condition
precedent to coverage, it is agreed that whenever [Blue Cross] makes
reasonable determinations which are not arbitrary and capricious in the
administration of the [plan] (including, without limitation, determinations
whether services, care, treatment or supplies are medically necessary.. ),
such determination shall be final and conclusive."9 4 The Brown court held
that the language conferred discretionary authority to construe the terms
of the plan and to determine benefits.95 In Atwood v. Newnont Gold Co.,
the specific language in the plan that granted discretion to Nev.mont to
determine severance benefits was "[Newmont] shall be the sole and
exclusive judge as to whether or not a termination is qualified for benefits
under the terms of this Plan."96  Similarly, in Doe v. Group
Hospitalization & Medical Services, Inc., the specific language conferring
discretionary authority to the defendant stated that the defendant "shall
"See id.
SSee Firestone, 4S9 U.S. at I 11.
9See id. at 112.
91Id. (quoting RESTATE mNT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1 S7 cmt. d (1959)),
92See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 89S F.2d 1556, 1559 (1 th Cir. 1990).
9 3See id.9 4See id.
95See id.
"Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995),
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have the full power and discretionary authority to control and
manage... the contract ....
The following language has also been held to grant discretionary
authority to the plan administrator to determine whether a treatment is
exempt from coverage: "[W]e will not cover the treatment... if, in our
sole discretion, it is not medically necessary .... We may apply the
following five criteria in exercising our discretion and may in our
discretion.. ." apply any or all of them.98 Therefore, as a threshold issue
under Firestone, before the court can determine whether the standard of
review is de novo or arbitrary and capricious, the court must make a
determination whether the plan grants discretionary authority to the
administrator of the plan.
THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW WHEN
COURTS FIND A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST UNDER ERISA
The Criteria For Determining When a Plan
Administrator Has a Conflict of Interest
A conflict of interest exists when an insurance company administers
claims under a policy it issued.99 The Eleventh Circuit referred to this
97Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv. Inc., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993). The complete terms
were stated in the Nov. 30, 1990, amendment as follows:
[Blue Cross] shall have the full power and discretionary authority to
control and manage the operation and administration of the Contract, subject
only to the Participant's rights of review and appeal under the Contract. [Blue
Cross] shall have all powers necessary to accomplish these purposes in
accordance with the terms of the contract including, but not limited to:
determining all questions relating to Employee and Family Member eligibility
and coverage; determining the benefits and amounts payable therefor to any
Participant or provider of health care services; establishing and administering
a claims review and appeal process; and Interpreting, applying, and
administering the provisions of the contract.
Id.
98Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 920 F. Supp. 477, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
[hereinafter Whitney 1].
99See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11 th 1990) ("A
final distinction involves the inherent conflict between the roles assumed by an insurance company
that administers claims under a policy it issued."). See also Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 123 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing conflicts of interest); Mattive v.
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type of conflict of interest as an inherent conflict of interest.c' The reason
that an inherent conflict of interest exists is because the insurance
company pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets rather than the
assets of a trust.' 10 This inherent or perpetual conflict occurs because the
insurer's fiduciary role conflicts with its profit-making role as a
business. 0 2 The Brown court also referred to this type of conflict of
interest as a strong conflict of interest. 3
In Brown, the defendant initially refused to cover two successive
hospital admissions because defendant concluded there was no pre-
admission certification which was required for all admissions except
emergency admissions." 4 The defendant later agreed based on review of
the medical records to cover the first admission as an emergency
admission.'05 Since the medical record should have been a part of a good
faith determination at the outset, the court found that the two different
conclusions based on the same evidence highlighted the conflict of interest
and seriously challenged "the assumptions upon which deference is
accorded to Blue Cross' interpretation of the plan.""2re
The courts use different terminology in identifying conflicts of
interest where the plan administrator is also the plan's insurer."'° The
terminology is also predictive of the outcome. For example, the Fourth
Circuit determined that a "substantial" conflict of interest existed in Doe
v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Senrices since the defendant Blue
Cross was the plan administrator as well as the plan insurer. '0 The
defendant had discretion to avoid claims which would promote its own
Healthsource of Savannah, 893 F. Supp. 1559, 1566 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (discussing conflicts of
interest).





3See id. A "strong conflict of interest exists when the fiduciary making a discretionary
decision is also the insurance company responsible for paying the claims . ... Id at 1561
(quoting Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (D. Minn. 19S9)).
""See id. at 1569.
'
05See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1569.
5Id. at 1569. The Brown court also observed that Blue Cross interpreted the plan to work
a forfeiture of benefits by Brown because the admission would have been covercd if pre-
certification had been obtained. See id. "As a general principle, employee benefit plans should
not be interpreted in such a way as to produce a forfeiture." Id.
107See id.
'See Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 86 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Becauze of the
presence of a substantial conflict of interest, we therefore must alter our standard of rev iew.")
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profit. 10 9 In that case, the plan was insured by payment of a fixed
premium and there was no evidence that the insurer would collect from
the employer retrospectively for unexpected liabilities. "
Similarly, a "substantial" conflict of interest exists when the insurer
is at financial risk if the cost of claims exceed the premiums collected.'"
For example, in Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the district
court held that the defendant was "particularly conflicted because of the
prospect of an unusually expensive benefit in a high-incidence disease.' 12
In that case, Empire approved coverage for HDC-ABMT for multiple
myeloma, a rare blood cancer, but not for breast cancer." 3 There was
testimony that the incidence of breast cancer is between 175,000 and
200,000 new cases per year, whereas the annual incidence of multiple
myeloma in the United States is only about 8000 cases.
14
Additionally, a "total" conflict of interest exists when the insurer is
the single beneficiary of a substantial sum of money based on the denial
of benefits. 115 Moreover, when the insurer is also the plan administrator
and the policy is changed to exclude coverage for HDC-ABMT, a
"classic" conflict of interest exists. 16
Some courts have found that even though a conflict of interest exists
the conflict does not play a significant role in the denial of benefits.' "7 In
Atwood v. Newmont Gold, even though Newmont was both the employer
and the plan administrator and had discretion to interpret the plan, the
court held that the "apparent" conflict of interest did not interfere with the
payment of severance benefits."8 In applying the Ninth Circuit's conflict
of interest standard, the court held that the plaintiff did not show that the
conflict of interest interfered with the decision to deny him severance
'OgSee id. at 85.
"
0See id. at 86.
"'See Whitney I, 920 F. Supp. at 477, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).112Id.
'See id.
"
4See id. at 482. There was testimony by Empire's medical director "that higher cost
treatments are more likely to be evaluated by Empire pursuant to the Experimental Exclusion, than
small cost items." Id.
'"1See Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53, 57 (4th Cir. 1995) ("A more
thorough explanation might have been necessary had the conflict of interest not been as total as
that in this case, where Blue Cross stood as the single beneficiary of a substantial sum based on
its denial of benefits.")
'16See Wilson v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 309, 312 (D.C. 1992).
"
7See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995).
1 See id.
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pay.n1 9 The fact that he was denied severance pay was not enough to
establish a breach of fiduciary duty. '"
In a case where the insurer had to pay only the first S30,000 of
expenses incurred plus twenty percent of additional expenses, the court
held that only a "limited" or "financial" conflict of interest existed.''
Whereas, in a case where the defendant filed an affidavit specifically
stating that, no conflict of interest existed since the plaintiff had already
exceeded defendant's coverage limit. The court reasoned a conflict of
interest was likely to be found and granted a preliminary injunction.' m
One court found no conflict of interest in a case where a self-funded
plan was administered by the employer with the health benefits claims
being administered by an insurer 3 Neither did the court find that there
was a substantial conflict of interest where the plan was fully funded and
any savings inured directly to the beneficiaries and participants of the
plan. 124 Likewise, there was no conflict of interest found where the
employer was the administrator of the medical assistance plan with
ultimate decision making authority, and an insurance company
administered claims and had discretion to make and review the benefit
determinations.125 However, another court found a conflict of interest in
a self-funded plan with stop-loss coverage being provided by the insurer
administrator because the cost of the HDC-ABMT was high enough to
trigger the stop-loss coverage. 126
"
9See id. at 1323. The plaintiff s counsel represented at oral argument that the plaintiffvas
not relying on any improper acts of the company or any personal motivations of the company's
employees. See id.
'
20See id. at 1323.12 Healthcare Am. Plans, Inc. v. Bossemeyer, 953 F. Supp. 1176, 1183 (D. Kan. 1996)
("HAPI was operating under a limited conflict of interest. If it had determined that the procedure
was covered, HAPI would have been required to pay the first S30,000 ofexpenses incurred; UCi%
ofthe additional expenses would have been covered by a reinsurance policy issued by Allianz Life
Insurance Company of North America.")
"See Marro v. K-Il Comm. Corp., 943 F. Supp. 247,253 (E.D-N.Y. 1996).
":See Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1992). K-Mart's Director of
Employee Benefits administered the self-funded plan, but had an administrative cerv ices contract
with Blue Cross & Blue Shield to administer the claims for health benefits. Sece d
1'4See De Nobel v. Vitro Corp. 885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 19S9).
25See Rose v. Bell South, No. 1: 96CV154-T, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76S0, at *10 (WD.
N.C. Apr. 30, 1997).
..
6See Glauser-Nagy v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 987 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (N-D- Ohio 1997.
Plaintiff's employer Seaway Food Town, Inc. self-funded the plan %,hich was administered by
defendant Medical Mutual of Ohio. The defendant also provided stop-loss coverage for the plan.
See id.
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The Standards of Review When Courts Find
a Conflict of Interest Under ERISA
The Circuit Courts of Appeal have applied different standards of review
to the denial of ERISA benefits cases where the fiduciary has a conflict of
interest. There are essentially four standards that are used by the Circuit
Courts of Appeal. The "burden-shifting" approach established by the
Eleventh Circuit, 127 shifts the burden to the fiduciary to prove that the
denial of benefits was not tainted by self-interest.'28 The "decreased
deference" approach followed by the Fourth'29 and Tenth Circuits13
decreases the deference accorded to the fiduciary's interpretation to
neutralize the conflict of interest. 131 The "heightened review" or "less
deferential" approach utilized by the Ninth Circuit 1 2 applies the
traditional abuse of discretion standard unless the beneficiary shows that
the conflict of interest caused a breach of fiduciary duty. 133 The "two-
step" approach followed by the Second Circuit1 4 applies the arbitrary and
capricious standard unless the conflict of interest affected the choice of a
reasonable interpretation. 131
The Burden Shifting Approach of
The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit applies a "burden shifting" approach to the review
of benefit denials by fiduciaries where there is a conflict of interest.'36
This test is also referred to as the "heightened arbitrary and capricious"
standard 137 or the "two-step" approach.33 This standard is applied when
... Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566 (11 th Cir. 1990).
"'See id.
"'Doe v. Group Hosp. & Medical Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993).
"3'See Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 123 (10th Cir. 1994).
13'See id.
13'Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
" See id.
"
4Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield Co., 106 F.3d 475,477 (2d Cir. 1997).
13See id.
36Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
'"Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, 893 F. Supp. 1559, 1566 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
"'Whitney 1, 920 F. Supp. 477,484 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (calling both the Eleventh Circuit test
in Brown and the Ninth Circuit test in Atwood v. Newiont Gold the "two-step" approach. The
main difference between the tests is that in the Brown "burden shifting" test, when the court finds
a conflict of interest the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove that its decision was not the result
of self-interest, whereas in the Ninth Circuit test in Atwood, the burden remains on the plaintiff to
prove that the conflict caused a breach of fiduciary duty).
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there is a substantial conflict of interest. 39 A substantial conflict of
interest exists when an insurer is the decision maldng fiduciary for
benefits paid out of its assets.140  The standard is triggered when a
fiduciary acting with discretionary authority interprets a disputed contract
term and denies benefits. When the standard is triggered, the court
accords less deference than would otherwise be appropriate if no conflict
of interest existed.
141
In Brown v. Blue Cross & Bhe Shield of Alabama the Eleventh
Circuit held that when a substantial conflict of interest exists, the burden
of proof shifts to the fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of the plan
is not tainted with self-interest. 42 In Brown, the substantive issue was
whether there was a reasonable basis for the fiduciary's decision to deny
benefits with the "reasonable basis" being modified by the Firestone
case. 43 Since the plan specifically granted discretionary authority to Bhte
Cross & Blue Shield, the standard of review applied under Firestone was
arbitrary and capricious.' 44 In applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review to the Brown case, the Eleventh Circuit proposed the
following analysis:
145
1. Determine the legally correct interpretation of the disputed
plan provision.
2. Determine if Brown has proposed a sound interpretation of
the plan, one that can rival the fiduciary's interpretation.
3. To evaluate whether the fiduciary was arbitrary and
capricious in adopting a different interpretation, the burden
of proof is shifted to the fiduciary to prove that its
interpretation of the plan is not tainted by self-interest.
4. If the fiduciary's interpretation of the plan is exclusively for
the benefit of the plan participants and beneficiaries, it would
satisfy the fiduciary's burden to purge the taint of self
interest.
39See id.
140See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561.
141See id. at 1564.
142See id. at 1566.
14Id. at 1559.
'"See id. Firestone refers to the standard of review in dicretionary situations a- abuZe of
discretion. See id. at 1558 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, v. Brueh, 4S9 US 101, 115
(1989)).
145SeeBrown, 898 F.2d at 1566-70 (describing the methodology recommended by the Fifth
Circuit in Denton v. First National Bank of Waco, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (Sth Cir 19S511,
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5. If the fiduciary carries the burden, the plaintiff can still
succeed if the fiduciary's action is arbitrary and capricious by
other measures.
In determining the appropriate standard of review after Firestone, the
Eleventh Circuit looked at pre-Firestone ERISA cases, trust law, and the
application of the "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion"
standard of review.146 Consistent with the Firestone case, this test is
grounded in the common law principles of trusts. 147
Brown's claim involved two hospitalizations."' The plan provided
benefits for hospital care for emergency admissions but required written
pre-certification for all other admissions.149 Brown's first admission was
an emergency admission for a sinus condition and his second admission
was for sinus surgery three days later. 5 ' Blue Cross initially denied both
admissions and then later covered the first admission because it was an
emergency. 151
One of Brown's theories interpreting the plan was that the second
admission was a continuation of the first admission. 52 The plan did not
define a single admission for purposes of an emergency; however, it did
define "single confinement" within the context of the number of days for
which major medical coverage is available during a single confinement to
a hospital. 53  It stated that "successive admissions to a hospital or
hospitals shall be deemed to result in a 'single confinement' if discharge
from and readmission to a hospital or hospitals occur within a ninety day
period."' 54 Blue Cross' interpretation of that portion of the plan was that
the language referred to a "confinement" and not to an "admission."''5
46Id. at 1559-1566. The Eleventh Circuit cases subsequent to Firestone equate the arbitrary
and capricious standard and the abuse of discretion standard which the Brown court uses
interchangeably. See id.
147See id. at 1567. The rule is an extension of the settled federal common law rule
developed under the Labor Management Relations Act and subsequently applied in another
context under ERISA. See id.
'










SSBrown, 898 F.2d at 1570.
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The court found Blue Cross' distinction to be "illusory."'5 6 However, the
court indicated that "Blue Cross may be able to explain why it is justified
in treating Brown's readmission only three days after discharge differently
from the conclusive presumption imposed in the plan for the limitation of
benefits payable .... 157
The court also found that evidence existed in the medical record
revealing that oral pre-certification was obtained prior to the second
admission.' The contract provided for vritten pre-certification;' -9
however, Blue Cross' counsel represented at oral argument that oral
approval ofpre-certification is commonplace."I ' Brown's hospital record
for the second admission indicated Blue Cross' telephone number and the
notation "Pre-Cert with Judy."' 6' There was also a Blue Cross record of
inquiry which showed contact between Blue Cross and Brown's hospital
and noted "PAC" and "hospital verification complete."'6" One inference
that the court drew was that a call was made and oral pre-certification was
obtained. 63
Under the "burden shifting" approach, the Brown court held that the
fiduciary was arbitrary and capricious because the initial hospitalization
was denied and then later covered based on the same medical record.L
Moreover, the claim for the second admission was denied without
pursuing the possibility that there was oral pre-certification for the second
admission. 65 Blue Cross also adopted an interpretation of the plan which
was inconsistent with the practice of oral pre-certification."' Blue Cross
156 Id.
'sid. The court also stated that the need for that information prevented it from granting
summary judgment to Brown. See id.
ISsSee id. at 1570-71.
'59See id. at 1571. The plan required the patient and the physician to fill out av, ritten form,
deliver it to Blue Cross and then await written notice by mail from the insurance company- Sce
id.
'("See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1570.
'Id. at 1571.
12Id.
'"See id. at 157 1. The court also inferred that Blue Cross acted arbitrarily and capnciously
in denying Brown's claim if it did not further pursue the possibility that oral pre-certfication v. a-
given. Since Browni's counsel did not present any argument to the district court regarding the oral
pre-certification, the Eleventh Circuit would not disturb the district court's grant of summary
judgment on an issue not raised. See id.
'"See id.
16See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1570-71.
'6"See id. at 1571.
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failed to meet its burden of proof that denial of coverage for the second
admission was not tainted with self-interest.
The Brown case has been consistently cited in conflict of interest
cases where ERISA benefits have been denied, although few circuits have
adopted the actual burden shifting approach.' 67 The Brown decision is
also frequently cited for its language regarding the amount of deference
to be accorded which "may be slight, even zero" by courts that do not
impose a burden shifting approach but follow the other tests.
68
The Decreased Deference Approach of
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits
The Fourth'69 and Tenth 7 ' Circuits apply a "decreased deference"
approach to the review of benefit denials by fiduciaries where there is a
conflict of interest. This standard is also referred to as a "sliding scale"'' I
or "continuum" test. 72 The standard is applied when there is a substantial
conflict of interest.' A substantial conflict of interest exists when an
insurer acting as a plan fiduciary has discretion to avoid claims which
would promote its own profit. 74 The standard is triggered when a
fiduciary acting with discretionary authority interprets a disputed contract
term which furthers the financial interests of the fiduciary.' When the
167See Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, 893 F. Supp. 1559, 1566 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(adopting burden shifting); Calhoun v. Complete Health Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1494,1498 (S.D. Ala,
1994) (adopting burden shifting); Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp,
1050, 1498 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (adopting burden shifting).
"
6SBrown, 898 F.2d at 1564. The entire quotation that is most frequently cited is "when the
members of a tribunal - for example the trustees of a pension fund - have a serious conflict of
interest, the proper deference to give may be slight, even zero; the decision if wrong may be
unreasonable."Id. at 1564 (quoting Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987)).
"'See Doe v. Group Hosp. & Medical Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 86 (4th Cir. 1993).
"7See Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1994).
"'Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir.
1987) (describing the "sliding scale" standard); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317,
1322 (9th Cir. 1995) (calling the review done by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits the "sliding
scale" test).
171Whitney, 920 F. Supp. 477,484 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (calling the test of the Fourth Circuit
and the Seventh Circuit a "continuum approach" which involves "a continuum of deference that
they will apply to decisions made by conflicted fiduciaries.")
See id.
"
4See Doe, 3 F.3d at 86.
17SSee id. at 87.
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standard is triggered, the court will not act as deferentially as would
otherwise be appropriate if no conflict of interest existed. 7 6
In Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services Inc., the Fourth
Circuit held that when a substantial conflict of interest exists, the
deference accorded the fiduciary decision will be decreased to neutralize
any untoward influence resulting from the conflict. The court described
the "decreased deference" standard as follows:
[W]e will review the merits of the interpretation to determine
whether it is consistent with an exercise of discretion by a
fiduciary acting free of the interests that conflict with those of the
beneficiaries. In short, the fiduciary decision will be entitled to
some deference, but this deference will be lessened to the degree
necessary to neutralize any untoward influence resulting from the
conflict. 77
This standard was derived from the common law principles of trust
and from the Firestone case which noted that the same principles apply in
the ERISA context. 78 In Doe, Blue Cross was compensated by a fixed
premium, and when it paid claims, it funded the payments from the
premiums collected. 79 The court's rationale for this rule is that even the
most conscientious fiduciary may unconsciously favor its profit interest
over the interest of the plan rather than acting objectively leaving
beneficiaries vulnerable.'80
In Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Serices,"'8 the Fourth
Circuit held that Blue Cross abused its discretion when the "decreased
deference" standard was factored into the review because of its financial
interests. 8 2 In Doe, the plaintiff sought health insurance benefits for
HDC-ABMT and radiation therapy prescribed for multiple mycloma, a
rare blood cancer.18 3 Blue Cross insured and administered his finm's
176See id.
"TSee id. at 87; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 emt. d. ( 957),
178See Doe, 3 F.3d at 87.
79See id. at 86.
'80See id. at 86-87.
'See id. at S0.
"
82See id. at 88.
... See Doe, 3 F.3d at 82.
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employee welfare benefit plan. 8 4 The plan had been amended and
specifically excluded "services or supplies for or related to" autologous
bone marrow transplants for multiple myeloma' 5 The plaintiff sued
pursuant to ERISA 86 for the denial of benefits and the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross. 87
Blue Cross' interpretation of the plan was that, since the ABMT was
not covered for multiple myeloma, the high dose chemotherapy and
radiation treatment were "services or supplies for or related to" the ABMT
and therefore were also not covered. 8 8 The court in Doe found that the
HDC and radiation constitutes the treatment for the cancer and that the
ABMT provides no treatment, but protects the bone marrow from damage
caused by the treatment. 189 The cancer treating procedures consisting of
the chemotherapy and the radiation were covered services in another
section of the contract. 90 The court stated that while "Blue Cross is well
within its rights to exclude from coverage the ancillary bone marrow
transplant procedure, the exclusion should not, in the absence of clear
language be construed to withdraw coverage explicitly granted elsewhere
in the contract."' 9' Since there was ambiguity in the "related to" language
the court construed the ambiguity against the drafter.'92
In applying the "decreased deference" standard, Blue Cross was not
entitled to the deference the court might have otherwise accorded it
because of the conflict of interest. 93 Had the Court accorded more
deference to Blue Cross' decision, it would have found that the HDC was
not covered since Blue Cross had discretion to interpret and construe the
terms of the contract. In the absence of the conflict of interest, the court
would have upheld Blue Cross' decision unless there was an abuse of
discretion. Under the Brown "burden shifting" approach, the court would
have come to the same conclusion or held that the ABMT was also
covered if the fiduciary was unable to prove that the decision to deny
184See id. at 82. The treatment was sought from Group Hospitalization and Medical
Services, Inc., doing business as Blue Cross and Blue Shield of the National Capital Area. See Nd,
...1d. at 88.
8629 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).
'See Doe, 3 F.3d at 82.
'"Id. at 88.
'See id. at 87.
See id.
'SSee id. at 88.
"zDoe, 3 F.3d at 88.
9'See id. at 88.
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benefits was not tainted with self interest. Applying either test results in
decisions contrary to the interpretation by the fiduciary, and unfavorable
to the insurance company because there is a conflict of interest.
Similarly, in Pitnan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Oklahoma the
Tenth Circuit relied on the Fourth Circuit's application of Firestone in
Doe.194 The policy had been changed to exclude coverage for multiple
myeloma. 9 ' Since the plan administrator was also the plan insurer, the
Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's grant ofsummary
judgment for the defendant because the district court failed to consider the
conflict of interest.196 The Tenth Circuit stated that under the Firestone
standard of review, the decision to deny benefits is not entirely insulated
by the administrator's discretion.'97 Because of the conflict of interest
standard, the court refused to uphold the language of the contract. t '3
The Heightened Review or Less Deferential
Approach of the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit applies a "heightened review" or "less deferential"
approach to the review of benefit denials by fiduciaries where there is a
conflict of interest. This test is also called the "two-step" approach. - The
standard is applied when there is a conflict of interest."z ' A conflict of
interest exists when the employer is acting as the plan administrator -
The standard is triggered when the administrator, acting with discretionary
authority, has an economic stake in the benefit decisions.-c3 When the
standard is triggered, the court will not act as deferentially as would have
otherwise been appropriate if no conflict of interest existed.'e'
In Atwood v. Newmont Gold, the Ninth Circuit held that the
traditional abuse of discretion standard applies unless the beneficiary
"9See Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 122(10th Cir 1994)
'
9SSee id. at 120.
I9SSee id.
'
97See id. at 124.
"'See id. at 120.
"'See Atwood v. Nenaiont Gold Co. Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994),
Z&)WhitneyI, 920 F. Supp. 477, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (descnbing the Ninth Circuit's test in
Atwood v. Nevvnont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir, 1994). as the "tv,,o-stcp"
approach).
"
0 See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1322.2 See id.
...See id.
7"'See id. at 1323.
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
shows that the conflicting interest caused a breach of the fiduciary duty. 05
If a breach of the fiduciary duty is shown, the deference normally
accorded the fiduciary dissolves and the court reviews the interpretation
de novo.20 6 The "heightened review" or "less deferential" approach that
the Ninth Circuit applied to the Atwood case is as follows:
207
1. Has the beneficiary provided evidence that the fiduciary's
self-interest caused a breach of the fiduciary duty? If not,
apply the traditional abuse of discretion.
2. If the beneficiary makes the required showing, the plan bears
the burden to show that the conflict did not affect the
decision to deny benefits.
3. If the plan cannot carry that burden the court will review the
decision de novo without deference to the administrator's
tainted exercise of discretion.
Since the plan reserved for Newmont discretion to interpret the term
at issue, Firestone's "abuse of discretion" or "arbitrary and capricious"
standard was appropriate."s The court found support for its holding in
other Ninth Circuit opinions that applied a traditional abuse of discretion
standard unless the beneficiary could show that the conflicting interest
caused a breach of the fiduciary's duty.20 9
This standard was derived from the principles of trust law.2 10 The
court stated that "the principles of trust law require us to act very
skeptically in deferring to the discretion of an administrator who appears
to have committed a breach of fiduciary duty., 21' However, before the
court will find a breach of fiduciary duty, more than a mere conflict of
interest must be shown.21 2 The court stated that "material, probative
20 See id. 1322-23.
201Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1322.207See id.2031d. at 1321 (discussing the difference between the "abuse of discretion" standard of
review and the "arbitrary and capricious" standard the court cited cases using both terms and
noted that "[t]he standards differ in name only").
209See id. at 1322.2t See id. at 1323.
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evidence beyond the mere fact of an apparent conflict" must be provided
by the beneficiary.21 3
In Ativood, the plaintiff resigned and requested severance pay.
2t4
Both severance pay plans governed by ERISA denied severance benefits
for voluntary resignation unless the resignation followed a "significant
diminution in duties or responsibilities."215 Atwood, a shop foreman, had
been reassigned several times without any change in his salary or grade
level prior to his resignation.1 6 The company concluded that his "last
position as shift foreman did not entail substantially less responsibility
than [his] previous assignments and denied severance benefits."21 7
Atwood sued for denial of his benefits.218 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.219
The plaintiffargued that, because he interpreted the plan to mean that
his resignation followed a substantial diminution in his duties and
Newmont interpreted the plan to mean just the opposite, the contract was
ambiguous and should be construed against the employer pursuant to
contra preferentum. 22' The court found that the terms "following" and
"substantial" were not ambiguous, but that the plaintiff merely took issue
withNewmont's determination ofhow closely the resignation must follow
thejob change and how substantial the reduction in duties must be. 2 The
court stated that the plan clearly granted discretion to Nevnont to
interpret the plan.222 The court also looked at Newmont's Summary Plan
Description (SPD) and found that, pursuant to ERISA, the SPD
sufficiently informed Atwood that he would be ineligible for benefits ifhe
resigned. 223 The court determined that it was not an abuse of discretion for
Newmont to conclude that the plaintiffs resignation did not follow a
substantial diminution in responsibilities." 4
2131d.
214See id. at 1320.
2151d.216See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1320-21.2171d. at 1320.
21See id. at 1320. Atwood brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132 (a)t 1)1B) (1994), Sce Id
21See id.
'2'See id. at 1324.
22'Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1324.
'See id. The specific language in the plan that granted discretion to Nemmont v,-a
"[Newmont] shall be the sole and exclusive judge as to whether or not a termination is qualficd
for benefits under the terms of this Plan." Id. at 1321.
2'See id. at 1321-22.
"24See id. at 1323-24.
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If the Ativood case had been decided under the Brown "burden
shifting" standard, the result would have been different. The court would
have found a substantial conflict of interest because the employer was the
plan administrator and had discretion to interpret the term at issue. The
burden of proof would have shifted to the plan administrator to
demonstrate that the decision to deny severance pay was not tainted with
self interest. Ifthe defendant was unable to carry that burden, the plaintiff
would have prevailed. Under the "decreased deference" standard of the
Fourth Circuit, the court would have decreased the deference accorded the
defendant's interpretation of the plan to neutralize the conflict of interest.
The result would have been indeterminate under the "decreased deference"
standard. Of significance to the court in Atwood was that the plaintiff's
pay did not decrease and that the SPD informed the plaintiff that if he
voluntarily resigned he would not be entitled to severance pay."' The
court also referred to the conflict of interest as an "apparent conflict. 226
Under the court's test an apparent conflict is not enough to show a breach
of fiduciary duty. 2
7
Under the Ninth Circuit standard, if the plaintiff had met his burden
and had proven that the conflict of interest caused a breach of the fiduciary
duty according to the common law of trusts, the fiduciary's decision
would have been presumptively void.228 Where the beneficiary has proven
a violation of fiduciary duty, the court will not defer to an administrator's
presumptively void decision.2 9 Under the Ninth Circuit's "heightened
review" or "less deferential" review, if the plaintiff can prove a breach of
the fiduciary duty the plaintiff will most likely prevail.
The Two Step Approach of the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit uses a "two-step" approach to review benefit denials
where the fiduciary has a conflict of interest.23 ° This standard is applied
where there is a substantial conflict of interest.23' A substantial conflict
of interest exists when an insurer is administering claims under a policy
22 See id. at 1320-22.
226Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1324.
227See id.
22See id. at 1323.229See id.
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issued by the insurer, and for which it is financially responsible. z2 The
standard is triggered when a fiduciary, acting with discretionary authority,
interprets a contract provision and denies benefits in an unusually
expensive and high incidence disease. 3 When the standard is triggered
the court will not act as deferentially as would otherwise be appropriate
if no conflict of interest existed.
In Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the Second Circuit
held that when there is a substantial conflict of interest the court should
apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of review unless the conflict
of interest affected the choice of a reasonable interpretation.23S The
Second Circuit adopted the following "two step" approach for determining
whether the administrator's interpretation of the plan is arbitrary and
capricious when there is a conflict of interest:-"
1. Determine whether the plan interpretation made by the
administrator is reasonable, in light of possible competing
interpretations of the plan.
2. Determine whether the evidence shows that the administrator
was in fact influenced by such conflict. If the Court finds
that the administrator was in fact influenced by the conflict
of interest, the deference otherwise accorded the
administrator's decision dissolves and the court interprets the
plan de novo.
This test was derived from Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense
Company237 and the Firestone case."5  Subsequent to the lower court
decision in Whitney,239 the Second Circuit rendered its opinion in Sullivan
"aSee Whitney 1, 920 F. Supp. 477,484 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
2"See id.
2"4See id.
235See Whitney I1, 106 F.3d at 477.
'"Id. at 475 (citing Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251 , 1255-56 12d
Cir. 1996)).
"'7See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir. 1996),
2"See id. at 1254.
'-"See Whitney I1, 921 F. Supp. 477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the lovcr court
applied the Brown "burden shifting" approach); Court Scrutinies, Revcrscs Insurcr on Rcflsal
to Payfor Cancer Treatment, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 16, 1996, atd6; DeForest & Duer,
Court Overturns Empires Exclusion qfHDC4BMT, N.Y. HEALTH L. UPD.TE, Apr. 1996, at dIS;
Evelyn Gilbert, Striking Back at Empire: Even After her Dcath, Barbara I'hatncy is Fighting to
Change the Way insurance Companies Evaluate Claims for Erperimcntal Trcatmcnts, THE
VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 18, 1997, at 44.
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which expressly rejected Brown's burden shifting approach as being
contrary to the traditional burden of proof in a civil case.240 In Sullivan the
Court rejected the standard of review in Brown.24' The court reasoned
that, unless the conflict affected the choice of a reasonable interpretation,
in cases turning on whether the decision was based on an alleged conflict
of interest, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is
appropriate.242
In Whitney, the plaintiffwas denied benefits for HDC and peripheral
stem cell support (PSCS) by Empire who insured her employee welfare
benefit plan governed by ERISA.243 Empire denied the treatment under
an experimental exclusion of the policy,2 " determining that the treatment
was experimental because it was provided pursuant to a Phase I research
protocol.2
45
The plaintiffs interpretation of the plan was that the definitional
standards which mandate that a treatment be supported by medically
acceptable proof of efficacy and appropriateness should be controlling.24 6
However, the definitional standards are followed by five discretionary
TEC criteria.247 The district court found the criteria in the policy so elastic
as to be almost meaningless.24' The district court relied on credible
physicians' testimony that HDC-ABMT is effective, appropriate, and
240See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1254.241See id.
242See id.243See Whitney 1, 921 F. Supp. 477, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Empire paid the cost of the
treatment under a reservation of rights. See id. at 479-81. The treatment was administered in
February and March of 1993, but Whitney died in July of 1993. See id. Her daughter was
substituted in the lawsuit as executrix of her estate. See id.
244See id. at 481. The Experimental Exclusion relied on by Empire to deny coverage states
in relevant part: Unless otherwise required by law ... we will not cover any treatment ... if, in
our sole discretion, it is not medically necessary in that such technology is experimental or
investigational. Experimental or investigational means that the technology is: (1) not of proven
benefit for the particular diagnosis or treatment of the Covered Person's particular condition; or
not generally recognized by the medical community as reflected in the published peer-reviewed
medical literature as effective or appropriate for the particular diagnosis or treatment of the
Covered Person's particular condition. Id. at 481. This section was followed by five discretionary
T.E.C. criteria. See id.
245See id. at 481. The protocol was supervised by an I.R.B., and she had to sign an informed
consent advising her of the unproven nature of the treatment. See id. The purpose of the study was
to determine the maximum tolerated dosage of the drug combinations. See id.246See id. at 486.
247See id.248See Whitney1, 921 F. Supp. at 486.
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proven beneficial, and that each of the criteria was met.249 There was also
testimony regarding numerous peer-reviewed articles demonstrating the
efficacy of the treatment.2
5 0
Empire sought to negate plaintiff's reliance on abstracts,' t but in
approving coverage for multiple myeloma it relied on five articles, two of
which were abstracts. 2-" The most compelling case of inconsistent
application of the TEC criteria was coverage for multiple myeloma for
which no phase IlI trials had been completed. 3
The Second Circuit's "two-step" standard is very similar to the test
used by the Ninth Circuit in Atwood v Newrnont Gold.5 4 The differences
are that the Ninth Circuit requires proof that the conflict caused the breach
of fiduciary dutye 5 and the Second Circuit requires proof that the conflict
affected the choice of a reasonable interpretation." Since the policy
covers HIDC-ABMT for multiple myeloma, which is a rare disease that
affects a fraction of the patients affected with breast cancer, it is very
likely that on remand the plaintiff will be able to prove that the conflict
affected the choice of a reasonable interpretation and caused the denial of
benefits.
Under a burden shifting approach the insurer usually loses unless the
insurer can successfully demonstrate to the court that expensive benefits
were denied for the purpose of benefiting the other plan participants and
beneficiaries. 2 7 The "decreased deference" or "sliding scale" standard
also does not benefit the insurer. It gives the court an opportunity to
decrease the deference normally accorded a fiduciary's decision and come
to a conclusion that is not provided for in the contract. If a conflict
situation cannot be eliminated the most favorable standards for the
insurance company are the "heightened review" or "less deferential"
standard of the Ninth Circuies or the "two-step" approach of the Second
Circuit which require the plaintiff to establish that the conflict caused a
249See id.
2"See id.
2'See id. at 487.
252See id.
23See Whitney1, 921 F. Supp. at 487.
'Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F. 3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
'sSee id. at 1323.
256See Whitney I1, 106 F.3d at 1255.
'See Brovn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1569 (1 th Cir. 1990).
2'Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323.
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breach of fiduciary duty or that the conflict affected the choice of a
reasonable interpretation of the plan. 59
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INSURANCE
COMPANIES TO AVOID THE
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STANDARDS
Pursuant to Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch,261 in order for the
reviewing court to apply an arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion
standard of review in the denial of benefits case, the ERISA plan must
specifically grant discretion to the administrator in determining benefits
and construing the terms of the plan.261 If the plan grants discretion to the
administrator and a conflict of interest exists, the standard of review is
arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion with the conflict of interest
being weighed as a factor.262 When a conflict of interest exists, the
reviewing court will not act as deferentially in applying the arbitrary and
capricious or abuse of discretion standard, and, in fact, may shift the
burden of proof to the defendant,263 find an ambiguity where treatment is
specifically excluded,264 or accord little or no deference to defendant's
interpretation of the plan.265
The only way to prevent the courts from essentially redrafting
insurance coverage agreements and providing coverage that is either
experimental or excluded in the policy is to avoid the conflict of interest
standard of review. Ideally, two separate entities should administer the
plan and insure the plan. Since this separation may not be feasible, the
insurer should be aware of the following recommendations.
'"' Whitney II, 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d Cir. 1997).
260See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).261See supra notes 87-89 and Section I. D.262See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
263See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1990);
Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1993);
Calhoun v. Complete Health Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1494, 1498 (S.D. Ala. 1994).2
"See Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 67 F.3d 53, 56 (4th Cir. 1995);
Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1994).
265See Bailey, 67 F.3d at 58.
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Where Coverage Is Specifically Excluded,
Courts Will Find That Treatments Not
Specifically Excluded Are Covered
Courts have ruled in favor of the plaintiff in cases where insurers have
attempted to specifically exclude coverage for HDC-ABMT.-' -  The
difficulty with specific exclusions is that anything that is not excluded
may be deemed to be covered when the court applies the conflict of
interest standard.
In Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, the court found that, since
the agreement specifically provided that "[b]one marrow transplants for
all other malignancies, including breast cancer, [are] not covered," HDC-
PSCR was covered.267 The defendant argued "semantics" and that both
treatments were essentially the same thing, but the court found that
semantics is "the stuff of contract interpretation."2 '3 The Mattive court
applied theBrown "burden shifting" approach to Healthsource's "inherent
conflict of interest" calling it a "heightened arbitrary and capricious"
standard.269 The court also found that Healthsource was legally wrong and
arbitrary and capricious in finding that HD C-PSCR was not a "therapeutic
service" which could at least be partially administered on an outpatient
basis. 270
Insurers need to be aware that if HDC-ABMT is specifically
excluded for breast cancer, a court might find that, because it is not
excluded for a different type of cancer, it must be covered. The
administrator's interpretation of the plan will not be given the deference
it deserves if the conflict of interest standard is applied. In Mattive, the
16'See Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, 893 F. Supp. 1559, 1572 (S.D. Ga. 1995);
Wheeler v. Dynamic Engineering, Inc. 850 F. Supp. 459,464 (E.D. Va. 1994).
:Mlattive, 893 F. Supp. at 1559. Regarding defendants claim that HDC-PSCR is
"experimental" the court concluded after a review ofaffidavits, literature, letters, and depasi ions
that HDC-PSCR effectively treats breast cancer and causes a high respone rate. Id at 157X
...Id. at 1572.
'69Id. at 1566.
271d. at 1568. Part of the proposed treatment would be given on an outpatient basis and part
in the hospital. See id. The insurance plan only covered "therapeutic sen ices" in the hozpital, Id
The court viewed the treatment as a whole. Id. Relying on Hendricks r Central Life Ins Co , 39
F.3d 507,514 (4th Cir. 1994), the court held that "the fragmenting of the phases of treatment and
the consideration of whether each fragment was covered under the terms of the contract produces
'an unrealistic anddistorted analysis."'Id at 1568 (quoting Hcndricks, 39 F.3d at 514). Hcndricks
also held that "fragmenting in this was (sic) would allow partial coverage for almost any treatment
'no matterhow inconsistent with good medical practice'" Id. at 1568 (quoting Hcndricks, 39 .3d
at 515).
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Eleventh Circuit "burden shifting" standard was applied which will almost
always result in a decision in favor of the plaintiff. If a conflict of interest
exists coverage exclusions should be broad enough to avoid the result that
occurred in the Mattive case.
Where HDC Is Specifically Excluded Courts
Will Find Ambiguity If Chemotherapy
Is Covered Elsewhere
When specific exclusions are made, if the services appear elsewhere in the
contract courts have deemed the contract ambiguous and have construed
the ambiguity against the drafter.27T When the conflict of interest standard
is applied, the court will not defer to the defendant's interpretation of the
plan.
In Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, the specific policy
language provided "autologous bone marrow transplants or other forms
of stem cell rescue (in which the patient is the donor) with high-dose
chemotherapy or radiation are not covered.., for breast cancer. 2 72 The
plaintiff conceded that SCR was not covered; however, since
chemotherapy was listed elsewhere under "covered services," the district
court deemed the policy ambiguous as it related to I-DC and construed the
ambiguity against the insurer.273 The Fourth Circuit held that Blue Cross'
discretionary decision was not entitled to deference because there was a
"total" conflict of interest; Blue Cross stood as the single beneficiary of
a substantial sum of money based on the denial of benefits.274
In short, the court found ambiguity because chemotherapy was
covered elsewhere. Since there was a conflict of interest in Bailey, the
court applied the Fourth Circuit's "decreased deference" standard which
resulted in the defendant being ordered to cover the HDC. In a different
jurisdiction with a different standard, a court could require coverage of the
27
'See Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53, 58 (4th Cir. 1995).2Md. at 55.
274Id. at 57. Blue Cross interpreted the disputed clause "with high dose chemotherapy" to
mean "and high dose chemotherapy." Id. The plaintiff argued that the clause made the contract
ambiguous. See id. The Fourth Circuit held that the policy should be interpreted with ordinary
contract principles by enforcing the plain language in the ordinary sense and construing an
ambiguous contract term against the drafter. See id. The court noted that ifHDC was not a service
"related to" ABMT in Doe it was reasonable to conclude that the policy exclusion covered only
PSCR and not the HDC. Id. Therefore, the plan provided coverage for all types of chemotherapy
including HDC. See id. at 57-58.
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entire treatment based on the ambiguity. Because there was a conflict of
interest the court had an opportunity to circumvent the intent of the
contract drafters. The only way to avoid the result in the Bailey case is by
avoiding the conflict of interest standard.
Coverage Decisions Should Be Referred to
Independent Medical Doctors
Where a conflict of interest exists, the insurer should only deny coverage
based on a decision by an independent outside medical entity." The
insurer should establish specific criteria for referring coverage decisions
to an independent medical entity, particularly when the treatment is
expensive or controversial. Decisions to deny coverage should be
supported by a complete analysis after a review of substantial evidence.
In Glauser-Nagy v. Medical Mutual of 01io,2o when the plaintiff
requested pre-approval of payment for HDC-PSCR, the request was sent
to an independent physician consultant for predetermination in accordance
with the defendant's procedures .2n The consultant reported that HDC is
appropriate in the investigational setting for stage III cancer and that no
randomized studies have been completed to assess the efficacy.7 3 Outside
of a clinical trial, the consultant was unable to determine how much
benefit the transplantation affords over chemotherapy, radiation therapy,
and hormonal therapy in patients with stage I1III breast cancer. Based
on the consultant's report, the defendant denied coverage for HDC-PSCR
as "experimentalinvestigational. ' '2 o
Subsequent to defendants denial of coverage for HDC-ABMT for
Stage III breast cancer, the plaintiff filed two internal appeals." 3 Each
appeal was evaluated by a different oncologist consultant. -'2  Both
275See Wolf, supra note 73, at 2105 (discussing whether a conflict of interest e\ist3 if an
insurance company has the right to reject the decision of an independent committee of medical
experts).
276Glauser-Nagy v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 987 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
2
"See id. at 1006. Medical Mutual asks its consulting physicians to u.Q guidelines
developed byBlue CrossiBlue Shield in conjunction with Kaiser Permanente in evaluating medical
necessity. The guidelines state that HDC-PSCR may be approved as medically ncec::ar r for
patients with Stage IV (metastatic) breast cancer but that it is still e\penmental'invet2ational for
patients with Stage II or III breast cancer. See id. at 1006-07.2 73See id. at 1008.27 See id.2SSee id. at 1010.
"S'See Glauser-Nagy 987 F. Supp. at 1010.
=See id.
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consultants reported that, based on the available data, the treatment was
investigational.283 The court found that a conflict of interest existed even
though the plan was self-funded by the employer and administered by the
insurer.284 The district court, relying on Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, stated that, not only does the plaintiff need to show that there
is a potential conflict of interest, but also "that the conflict affected the
reasonableness of the [administrator's] decision."285 The plaintiff made
no such showing and the court found no evidence that the defendant
applied any pressure to its independent consultants to effectuate the denial
of coverage or that the physicians were motivated by a desire to enhance
their personal or corporate financial position at plaintiffs expense.2 86
However, a different result occurred in Marro v. K-IIl
Communications,287 a brain cancer case where treatment for HDC-ABMT
was denied. In Marro, the defendant referred coverage decisions to two
outside doctors whose opinions were relied on to deny pre-certification.2s
The court noted that the experts were used for high technology, high risk,
and high cost medical procedures, and that Prudential retained the right to
reject the views of the doctors.290  Although the defendant filed an
affidavit specifically stating that, since the plaintiff had already exceeded
defendant's coverage limit no conflict existed, the court granted a
preliminary injunction finding that it was unlikely that defendant would
be found free of a financial conflict of interest.29'
283See id.
284See id. at 1011. A conflict of interest existed because the cost of the procedure requested
by the plaintiff was high enough that the stop-loss coverage provided by the defendant would
likely be triggered if the requested coverage were provided. See id.
.
8 Id. (quoting Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir.
1997)).2 6See Glauser-Nagy, 987 F. Supp. at 1011.
2"See Marro v. K-Ill Comm. Corp., 943 F. Supp. 247, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
2"See id. at 248.
21'See id. at 249.
"'See id. at 253.
21'See id. In Glauser-Nagy v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, the court may have fbund for the
defendant because the patient had stage III breast cancer rather than stage IV breast cancer. See
Glauser-Nagy v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 987 F. Supp. 1002,1006 (N.D. Ohio 1997). HDC-ABMT
may still be experimental for certain types of breast cancer, other than stage IV breast cancer and
for other cancers. For example in Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., less than five
women received HDC-ABMT for the treatment of epithelial ovarian cancer. See Martin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 115 F.3d 1201, 1209 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit found no
abuse of discretion "even the more limited discretion afforded to a fiduciary acting under a
possible conflict of interest, in concluding that the procedure here was experimental or
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Even under the conflict of interest standards, if the insurer is able to
obtain the unbiased opinions of an independent consultant or if the insurer
does a thorough investigation before denying benefits for expensive and
controversial treatment, the plaintiff-will have much difficulty proving that
the conflict of interest caused a breach of the fiduciary duty or that the
conflict of interest affected the choice of a reasonable interpretation of the
plan.
Coverage Denials Should Be Based
Upon Substantial Evidence
The decision to deny expensive controversial treatment as experimental
should be made only after making a complete analysis and reviewing
substantial evidence. A complete analysis of the matter means that
information both for and against the treatment is reviewed.
In Healthcare America Plans v. Bossenmeyer (HAPI) the United
States District Court in Kansas applied the Tenth Circuit's "sliding scale"
approach in a conflict of interest case regarding the denial of coverage for
HDC-PBSCR for stage II breast cancer.292 The court in that case held that
the defendant did not abuse its discretion in finding that HDC-PBSCRwas
experimental for stage II breast cancer.293 The court upheld the denial of
coverage under the exclusion for "experimental, unproven or obsolete,
investigational or educational as determined by Health Plan.' ' 4 The
plaintiff argued that HAPI lacked substantial evidence on which to base
its decision to deny coverage, that its Board members were influenced by
their conflict of interest, and that it demonstrated bad faith by searching
for sources which would support its denial of coverage.5 s The court
found that HAPI invested a great deal of time and effort gathering and
investigative when used to treat epithelial ovarian cancer." Id at 1209.
'22Healthcare Am. Plans, Inc. v. Bossmeyer, 953 F. Supp. 1176, 1189(D Kan. 1996). The
court determined that in deciding whether the plaintiff's proposed treatment was covered "HAPI
was operating under a limited conflict of interest." Id. at 1183. Under the Tenth Circuit "sliding
scale" approach "the reviewing court will always apply an arbitrary and capricious standard, but
the court must decrease the level of deference given to the conflicted administrator's decision in
proportion to the seriousness of the conflict." Id. at 1189.
2 See id. at 1191.
294Id. at 1191.
2sId. at 1189.
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reviewing information from reputable and pertinent sources and based its
decision on substantial evidence.296
Substantial evidence consists of the following:
2 97
1. Current peer reviewed medical literature.
2. Affidavits of medical experts for and against the treatment.
3. Questions regarding the experimental nature of the treatment
posed to medical experts.
4. Appellate and District Court opinions.
CONCLUSION
The decision to deny coverage for potentially life-saving medical
treatment is difficult. The ERISA fiduciary must act in the best interest
of all beneficiaries. The duty to protect the assets of a trust is clear where
an ERISA plan is self-funded. The distinction becomes blurred where an
insurance company not only insures the plan but also administers the plan.
The decision to deny benefits under an insurance policy where there is a
conflict of interest may not be in the best interest of all of the
beneficiaries. It also allows for judicial intervention, which results in
inconsistent outcomes. Until the Supreme Court establishes a standard
more specific than Firestone which requires that a "conflict be weighed
as a factor" in determining whether the administrator was arbitrary and
capricious, the elimination of a conflict of interest is the best way to make
sure that insurance contract language is upheld.
296See id. at 1188. In applying the Tenth Circuit's "sliding scale" approach to HAPI's
alleged conflict of interest, the court found no abuse of discretion. Also, the evidence did not
show that the defendant applied pressure on its staff or patient care committee to deny coverage.
See id. at 1191.297See Healthcare Am. Plans, 953 F. Supp. at 1189-91.
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